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by David Marsden
T
here is a paradox to be explained concerning the
spread of performance-related pay (PRP) in the
British public services. It has been common to
associate the introduction of PRP with the aim of
improving incentives and motivation among public
employees. Starting in the late 1980s, the British public
services embarked on the most systematic and sustained
policy of extending and developing performance-related pay
of any OECD country, mostly replacing annual seniority-
related pay increments with performance-related ones
based on goal setting and appraisals by line managers. 
Nevertheless, after surveying both academic research
findings and inside management information, the govern-
ment’s Makinson report concluded in 2002 that perform-
ance pay had not motivated public employees in Britain and
that its operation had been divisive. Given that the policy
has been sustained by three successive prime ministers of
quite different political persuasion – Margaret Thatcher,
John Major and Tony Blair – as well as successive top
public service managers, its continued use cannot plausibly
be explained by political dogma. Likewise, in the face of
such evidence, the perseverance of top public management
and of successive governments with PRP is hard to under-
stand, if employee motivation is the main story. We need to
look elsewhere for an explanation.
An alternative explanation can be found in the use of
performance pay (and of performance management more
widely) to provide a framework for renegotiating perform-
ance standards with employees. This is consistent both
with rising organisational performance, which would explain
top management’s perseverance, and with all the evidence
that PRP has failed to motivate many public employees.
It has been common to analyse the workings of PRP
through the lenses of three main theories: agency,
expectancy, and goal setting. These theories shed much
light on the static incentive and appraisal processes present
in PRP. They have focused mainly on how management can
influence employees’ choice between different levels of
effort or care in their work for a given set of performance
norms. To understand what has happened with PRP in the
British public services, however, one needs to complement
the perspective provided by these theories with a more
dynamic analysis of inducements for employees to agree to,
and work within, a new set of performance norms.
The idea of renegotiation is most simply explained in terms
of contract theory. A worker and a firm agree to the terms
of their exchange when the worker is hired. A key feature of
the employment contract is that it should be open-ended in
terms of both its duration and its content. Workers agree to
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They are likely to be motivated and to deliver higher
performance. Others may resent the new arrangements
and not find the pay scheme motivating. Nevertheless, their
lack of motivation may not necessarily translate into a
decline in their performance. Such employees must weigh
the benefits of accepting the new scheme against the costs
of finding an alternative. They may not like the new system,
but they may still choose to work within it because chang-
ing jobs is not worth their while and they do not wish to be
dismissed. 
The greater management attention to goal setting and
performance appraisal that accompanies PRP is likely to
increase the effectiveness with which the new work norms
are monitored and discourage reduced performance.
Provided performance of the discontented does not fall too
much, the organisation may still benefit from the increased
performance of those who engage positively, assuming they
do so in sufficient numbers.
In this reading, renegotiation and incentive can be comple-
mentary functions of PRP. One can say that the incentive
mechanisms and, particularly, the goal-setting mechanisms
have to be working properly for PRP to be an effective
means of changing work norms. Agency theory also
provides a picture of the static functions of PRP. It explains
how performance and output incentives encourage employ-
ees to work hard (and not to “shirk”), even when manage-
ment finds it costly to monitor their effort closely. It suggests
that management can respond by tying pay to output so as
to induce employees to choose a higher level of effort and
also, by investing in better systems of work design and
performance evaluation, to improve the correlation between
performance measures and effort, thus strengthening
incentive effects. It also warns against the dysfunctions of
inappropriate incentives, such as individual incentives that
discourage cooperation among colleagues.
Expectancy theory, like agency theory, treats employees as
having a degree of choice and places a strong emphasis on
the motivational effects of incentives and on the problems
posed by poorly defined targets. Simplifying somewhat, it
identifies a potentially virtuous circle. Employees will
respond to the incentive or reward on offer if they value it
(valence), if they believe good performance will be instru-
mental in bringing the desired reward (instrumentality) and
if they expect their efforts will achieve the desired perform-
ance (expectancy). The circle of valence-instrumentality-
expectancy can be broken at a number of points.
Employees may feel they lack scope to increase their effort,
or that their effort will make little difference to their perform-
ance. This undermines expectancy. They may believe that
management lacks the competence or the good faith to
evaluate and reward their performance fairly, a view that
undermines instrumentality. Applying these considerations
to renegotiation, one can see that employees are more likely
give management some
flexibility to adapt that
content to changing
demands, but only within
certain limits. From time to
time, these limits require
revision. Such a juncture becomes
an occasion for renegotiation. By now,
however, each party has made investments in the relation-
ship and is vulnerable to pressure tactics from the other.
Much of the contract literature emphasises pay, because of
changes in the market valuation of employee output. Less
visible, but just as important for management, is its ability to
revise job boundaries and to redefine the nature and
standards of performance that it requires from employees.
These standards, which may include qualitative aspects of
performance, are usually the subject of a tacit understand-
ing between staff and management, sometimes called the
“effort bargain”.
By what processes does renegotiation come about? Many
recent studies have focused on the role here of collective
bargaining. Their main interest, however, has been in pay
adjustments. Pay rules are generally codified by virtue of
their inclusion in collective agreements and individual
contracts of employment. In contrast, many of the rules
relating to workers’ job boundaries and performance
standards contain a large uncodified element. It is common
for jobs to deviate considerably from their formal job
descriptions. The features of a given job are therefore
accessible to higher management only through the eyes of
first-line managers. To renegotiate performance, manage-
ment needs to get right down to the level of individual jobs
and to the relationship between individual employees and
their line managers.
Collective agreements often
set the overall framework,
but ultimately this kind of
negotiation has to occur
between line managers and
individuals, or small groups of
employees in the same office or
hospital ward.
At the time of hiring, workers who do not like the supervi-
sory practices and incentive systems that the employer
offers can just walk away, so there is a process of self-
selection matching these job features to workers’ prefer-
ences. However, when the time comes for changing work
practices and incentive systems in an established organisa-
tion, the employer faces an incumbent work force whose
preferences for or against the new system may vary consid-
erably. In the change, some will expect to be winners and
others losers. To get everyone to engage positively in the
new system, management would have to offer a very attrac-
tive and costly deal. It might, therefore, prefer to make the
new deal attractive to a sufficient proportion of its staff, so
that the scheme functions tolerably well, and to forego the
support of the remaining staff in order to keep within some
budgetary limit.
So the “renegotiation” explanation leads us to expect any
net performance improvements in this study to depend on
the combined effects of the move to new work norms and
the attractiveness of the incentives provided by the new
PRP system. However, neither effect is uniform across all
employees. Some will be positively attracted to the new
deal, which comprises both new norms and new incentives.
Employee motivation is
not the main story
There will be winners and losers
Revision becomes an
occasion for renegotiation
It is common for jobs to deviate
from their formal description
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ual bargaining power on workers. Of course, a large organ-
isation can always face down an individual worker, no
matter how skilled or talented, but it cannot afford a gradual
bleeding away of its skilled personnel. It is not possible for
a management just to impose its optimal design. It has to
negotiate its way to an approximation of that design and, in
so doing, to respect the various budgetary and efficiency
constraints it must satisfy to meet its own objectives.
In his 1999 Journal of Economic Literature review of work
on incentives, Canice Prendergast commented on the need
to extend the study of incentives beyond CEOs, sales
personnel and sports stars. Such people often have short
job tenures and their high rate of labour turnover means that
self-selection often brings about a match between
employee preferences and the type of incentive offered by
the organisation. The public service has highlighted the
opposite problem, where high labour stability, especially
during the early to mid-1990s, meant that employers had to
obtain results from new incentive schemes when imple-
menting them for a large incumbent work force. 
The public services’ experience of PRP has also highlighted
the key role of line managers. They are essential to the
renegotiation process because they are the link between
top management’s goals and the way ordinary staff carry
out their jobs. This introduces another layer in the principal-
agent analysis of incentives. Line managers’ abilities and
interests are not identical to those of top management and
they have no protective gatekeepers controlling staff
access to them. When agreeing to performance objectives
with individual staff, the pressures on them to be lenient are
great. What seems to have kept these pressures mostly at
bay has been the articulation between performance objec-
tives at different levels within the public organisations. This
has provided support to line managers and given them the
means to keep a focus on broader organisational perform-
ance when establishing individual objectives. 
David Marsden is Professor of Industrial Relations at the LSE and
a member of the CEP.
This article is based on the data from a series of attitude surveys
of employees and line managers in six areas of the public service:
the Inland Revenue, the Employment Service, two NHS trust
hospitals and head teachers in primary and secondary schools. A
fuller article, including an extended discussion of the data, will be
published in the Industrial and Labor Relations Review in April.
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to buy into a new incentive scheme when they perceive it as
operating fairly and able to deliver the promised rewards.
Goal-setting theory places less emphasis on rewards and
stresses the motivating power of defining appropriate work
goals and engaging employee commitment to them. Of
special relevance in the current context is its emphasis on
dialogue between line managers and employees to
exchange information about realistic goals and on agreeing
to them, so that employees adopt them as their own. This
framework already contains the germs of a negotiation
process between employees and their managers. So it is
easy to see how the basic idea can be applied in the context
of renegotiating performance norms. Goal setting may be
especially important for the employees who do not like the
new system, but still prefer not to change jobs. In such
cases, it provides management with a channel to clarify the
new standards and establish agreed levels of compliance.
Thus, although the last three approaches – agency,
expectancy and goal setting – differ in emphasis, they point
to the same key processes and variables for the analysis of
performance pay systems: reward and motivation on the
one hand and goal definition and evaluation on the other.
My argument is that the main impact of the introduction of
PRP across large sections of the British public services
during the 1990s was to facilitate the renegotiation of
performance norms. When introducing a new incentive
scheme to an established work force, management is
almost certain to encounter a wide spread of employee
preferences and the problem of winners and losers. Thus,
even when a scheme is well designed and managers are
well prepared to operate it, there will frequently be not only
employees who respond favorably and agree to the new
norms, but also others who resent the norms and consider
themselves worse off. Whereas the former are positively
motivated to improve or adapt their performance, the latter
are not and managers hold them to the new performance
norms by means of goal setting and appraisal. In this way,
one can explain why successive governments and top
managers have believed in the merits of PRP for the public
services despite the evidence – of which they were certainly
aware – that many employees saw little incentive and much
divisiveness in them.
To some extent, renegotiation has emerged as a latent
rather than an explicitly stated goal of PRP in the public
services. When senior managers at the Inland Revenue
were asked in 1991 about the goals of the PRP scheme
they operated then, they responded in terms of motivation.
Likewise, officials of the union representing Inland Revenue
staff had encouraged their members to complete the
questionnaires because they expected the survey to
demonstrate publicly what they already knew: that the
scheme was not motivating staff. The second Inland
Revenue scheme, introduced in 1993, did not speak of
renegotiation, but used the language of agreeing to objec-
tives and establishing a “contract” with individual employ-
ees and of relating these to the department’s operating
plans. 
This is where contract theory, and some of the older indus-
trial relations literature, may prove helpful in understanding
what is going on. Unions and their workplace representa-
tives may be weaker now than in years past, but the labour
market continues to confer sometimes considerable individ-
Management can
respond by tying
pay to output
